Political or Legal Systems

A common method is to require a special majority in the legislature – two-thirds in Germany, three-fifths in France, with similar systems in India and other Commonwealth countries (and this was the case in the Soviet bloc). Another parliamentary alternative is to ask for a second vote (Italy, Denmark, Finland). Finally, some systems divide the power of amendment between legislators and citizens by requiring a referendum either for certain types or methods of change (Denmark, France, Ireland) or for each (Japan). At the same time, it was also very specific to the Kádár regime that these same presidents could serve as a gatekeeper against direct political pressure. They spoke the language of authority, but filtered out outside pressures; In addition, they had to defend the administrative and financial interests of the organization. According to interviews with the judges, this dual identity was itself a sign of the corresponding change in the nature of political authority; The judges themselves could use this channel in several cases to reach scarce goods such as telephones, cars or the allocation of housing. Footnote 83 There are also legal systems that differ significantly from the common law and civil law systems. Other communist and socialist legal systems (e.g. Cuba and North Korea) are based on assumptions very different from those of English common law or European civil law. Islamic and other religion-based legal systems bring different values and assumptions to social and business relations.

Professional elements were constantly questioned because the official program of the Communist Party was based on a total recalibration of the state bureaucracy with political reliability as its main objective. Footnote 56 The continuous selection of judges, similar to an election campaign, reached all legal professions and lasted until the early 1960s. This existential uncertainty was officially justified by the ideological limits of jurists to the old capitalist power and liberal thought. But the political goal was to build a new “democratic” intellectual class. In 1953, when the Communist Party was still dissatisfied with the loyalty process, a party decree blamed the politically unreliable judicial system and called for a new wave of dismissals of disloyal judges. Footnote 57 The political intention to create loyal judges and prosecutors was manifested in the founding of the “Judicial and Prosecutorial Academia”, in which, after a few months of ideological training and little technical-legal training, reliable young workers and peasants received a “legal degree”. They were the first appointed to senior positions in the judicial system. When the first year graduated from ELTE University in 1953, the Academy was no longer needed and all “university lawyers” had to enroll in evening training at the university. The first cohort completed their studies at ELTE the same year and was divided centrally into the most important and important positions. Footnote 58 For ideological reasons – for example, the salary of public servants could not far exceed that of a worker – the justice system suffered from labour shortages and high turnover.

Beginning in the 1970s, other legal jobs paid much better, and talented, hard-working lawyers often sought alternative employment after a few years of judicial work. When the twin problems of labour shortages and overload reached the administrative centres, the official reaction did not emerge from the ideological cage; The phenomenon appeared in the thinking of party and state leaders as a disciplinary issue. If a judge tried to find another job during her judicial tenure, she committed a disciplinary offence. Disciplinary dismissal could deter them from obtaining legal employment. Footnote 88 The employer – at the highest level, the Presidential Council – did not dismiss judges without adequate justification. This existential link forced the judges to look for alternative solutions; In the event of judicial incapacity, fugitive judges may leave their judicial functions. Thus, some have received medical certificates of mental incapacity for work. Footnote 89 The first epoch of socialist legality was marked by grave paradoxes. It was defined in the official text as “revolutionary legality” and had a more political basis that served the rapid change of system.

All anarchies and miscarriages of justice were taken with reference to revolutionary legality. The will of the working class was embodied in the vanguard of the Communist Party and its actions. Legality had no dogmatic or jurisprudential background, it was exhausted in an empty ideological reference. The history of socialist legality fills the empty shell with different contents. The authoritarian political tradition, the limited application of the principle of separation of powers and the absence of strong guarantees of judicial independence have prevented the Hungarian legal system from forming a state governed by the rule of law. In this culture and practice of unlimited government, the position of the judge remained subordinate and the judiciary did not count as the limit of the executive, just as Parliament did not control its power. The communist seizure of power rapidly transformed political and legal institutions according to the Stalinist model. During the socialist era, judicial autonomy could not be developed, but in the second phase of the communist regime, judges achieved relative personal independence. The meaning of socialist legality changed in political documents, but its actual content did not threaten either the party-state or the party`s pervasive influence. It was not until the very end of his reign, in the mid-1980s, that a concept based on the rule of law emerged.

In recent years, the Indonesian economy has continued to grow; to become a popular candidate for foreign direct investment. This positive growth, coupled with a now stable political situation, is moving Indonesia from low to middle income. The country moved from authoritarian rule in 1998 to its current state of democracy. The exodus of politics and ideology was long, hard and partly illusory, because under the regulation of the party-state and under the official ideology of combined power, the judiciary could only be relatively independent. Since the structural characteristics of the communist regime remain, the autonomy of the judiciary and the independence of judges cannot be complete. But some political intentions have been achieved without a severe suppression of independence. The legal system and the social context severely limit the judge`s room for manoeuvre and the general direction of jurisdiction; Thus, political rationality has permeated the daily work of judges. It is symptomatic that already the second decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on Justice in February 1918 made the old statutes of 1864 binding on the district people`s courts. According to this rule, judges had to apply government decrees and, in the absence of a decree, socialist consciousness could serve as a “guide” for judges.

Footnote 19 By mid-century, the secular elements of the socialist legal system were limited to lay members of judicial organs and comrade courts, who had jurisdiction only in cases of petty crime. The modernization program and even the goal of transforming society, the formation of Homo Sovieticus (footnote 20) and the socialist community could be achieved through central autocratic formal institutions. The development of Soviet law was characterized by the oscillation between legal regulation and anarchy. “In fact, anarchy and anarchy were present; And while the regime depended on anarchy for the success of the revolution, it sought to bring order to the work of its own courts by correlating this activity with available laws. Footnote 21 From the outset, the number of Orders in Council as guiding principles for judges increased rapidly.

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