Why Do We Have Legal Rights

AWS are rules that bind everyone who lives in a community. Laws protect our overall security and protect our rights as citizens from abuse by others, organizations, and the government itself. We have laws that ensure our overall security. These exist at the local, state, and national levels and include things like: While they do not necessarily share Mill`s view that all rights are linked to the foundations of well-being, many contemporary writers (e.g., Raz 1984a, 1984b; Wellman 1985, 1995) agree that the basic concept of a law is something common to law and morality, although some have argued that legal authors, particularly Hohfeld, provide a better and clearer starting point for general analysis than previous authors in moral philosophy. The view that the basic concept is common to both seems consistent with the assertion that legal claims concerning justification in practical reasoning should nevertheless be based on moral claims. Human rights could also exist independently of their legal application as part of actual human morality. All human groups seem to have morals in the sense of compelling norms of interpersonal behavior supported by reasons and values. These moral values contain specific norms (e.g., the prohibition of intentionally killing an innocent person) and specific values (e.g., the value of human life). If almost all human groups have a morality that contains norms prohibiting murder, these norms could partially establish the human right to life. Following the ratification of the Rome Statute by 60 countries, the first permanent international criminal court to hear cases related to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide entered into force in 2002.

This International Criminal Court (ICC) convicts people accused of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, but only when national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute these crimes. So far, the ICC has examined five situations in northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Sudan (Darfur), and Kenya. Its groundbreaking jurisprudence has contributed to advancing the understanding of human rights, such as incitement to genocide and the right to free and fair elections. Some examples of groups whose rights are of particular concern are animals[7] and among humans, groups such as children[8] and adolescents, parents (mothers and fathers), men and women. [9] Should human rights be defined as minimum rights? A number of philosophers have argued that human rights are minimal in the sense that they are not too numerous (a few dozen rights instead of hundreds or thousands) and are not too demanding (see Joshua Cohen 2004, Ignatieff 2005 and Rawls 1999). Their views suggest that human rights are more about avoiding the worst than getting the best. Henry Shue suggests that human rights are about the “lower limits of tolerable human behavior” rather than “great aspirations and lofty ideals” (Shue 1996). Where human rights are modest norms, they leave most legal and political issues to democratic decision-making at the national and local levels. This allows human rights to be a high priority, to take into account the major cultural and institutional differences between countries and to leave ample space open for democratic decision-making at the national level. Nevertheless, there is no contradiction in the idea of an extremely long list of human rights, and therefore minimalism is not a defining feature of human rights (for the critique of the view that human rights are minimum standards, see Brems 2009 and Raz 2010).

Minimalism is best seen as a normative recipe for what international human rights should be. Moderate forms of minimalism have considerable appeal, but not within the framework of the definition of human rights. In addition to these two important instruments, the Council of Europe`s work in the field of human rights includes other specific instruments and conventions that complement the guarantees and provisions of the ECHR by addressing specific situations or vulnerable groups. Traditional monitoring systems are complemented by other independent bodies such as the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance and the Commissioner for Human Rights. Overall, the Council of Europe`s work on human rights should be able to take into account social, scientific and technological developments and the new challenges they may pose to human rights. The Council of Europe, with its 47 member states, has played a key role in promoting human rights in Europe. Its main human rights instrument is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (also known as the European Convention on Human Rights). This has been accepted by all Council of Europe member states as a precondition for membership. It was adopted in 1950 and came into force three years later. It guarantees civil and political rights, and its greatest strength is its implementation mechanism, the European Court of Human Rights.

This court and its jurisprudence are admired throughout the world and often invoked by the United Nations and by the constitutional courts of many countries and other regional systems. Political theorists would add a number of political roles or functions to the four elements of definition proposed above. This kind of view may be plausible for the very important international human rights law that has emerged in international law and policy over the past fifty years. But human rights can exist and function in contexts that do not involve international control and intervention, such as a world with one state. Imagine, for example, that an asteroid impact kills everyone in every country except New Zealand, making it the only state in existence. To be sure, the idea of human rights, as well as many dimensions of human rights practice, could persist in New Zealand even if there were no international relations, laws or policies (for such an argument, see Tasioulas 2012). And if, in the same scenario, a few people were found who survived in Iceland and live without a government or state, New Zealanders would know that human rights dictate how these people should be treated, even if they are stateless. The depth of the idea of human rights must be deeply rooted in international law and international practice should not be regulated by decree by definition. However, we can allow the kind of political functions described by Rawls and Beitz to be generally fulfilled by international human rights today. Since 1964, the United Nations has dealt primarily with the rights of women and minorities through special treaties such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2007). See also Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).

Specialized treaties allow international standards to address issues specific to specific groups, such as support and care during pregnancy and childbirth for women, child custody issues, and the loss of historical territories by indigenous peoples. Proponents of political conceptions of human rights are often agnostic or skeptical of universal moral rights, while rejecting general moral skepticism and believing that it is possible to provide strong normative justifications for the content, normativity and role of human rights (for challenges to purely political opinions, see Gilabert 2011, Liao and Etinson 2012, Sangiovanni 2017 and Waldron 2018). While some (e.g., d`Almeida 2016) argued that Hohfeld was right when he argued that freedoms include only permissions, others (e.g., Waldron 1981 and Raz 1984a, 1984b) argued that rights should only be seen as a reinforcement of duty. Hart (1973) had argued, following Bentham, that a right to liberty should be considered a bilateral authorization for A, with the obligation of others not to interfere with X`s A-ing. Waldron and Raz argue that an important feature of rights is that they allow the right holder to do not only what is right, but also (within certain limits) what is wrong. The best explanation for this is that rights only see obligations of non-interference for others and not as granting permission to the right holder. (See also Herstein 2012, 2014.) Another view (Campbell 1997) is to consider certain rights such as licensing, but pointing out that when granting a legal authorization, the law does not say that there can be no grounds against the performance of the act, but only that (within the limits of the authorization) the law will act as if there were none. Complaints against a State are submitted to a commission or committee in a so-called quasi-judicial procedure. The Board of Supervisors then takes a decision and States are expected to comply, even if there is no enforcement procedure. Often, a State must make an additional declaration or ratify an optional protocol to signal its acceptance of the complaints system. The Human Rights Committee (or “ICCPR Committee”) and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (within the United Nations system) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (within the Organization of American States) are examples of bodies dealing with such complaints.

An overview of Hart`s theory (1973) can be given as an illustration of the first point of view. According to Hart, someone (call him “X”) can be a legitimate rights holder, mainly in two ways.

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